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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
Petitioner/Respondent Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg (hereafter "Agency")

petitioned the District Court pursuant to the Judicial Confirmation Law, Title 7, Chapter 13, Idaho
Code, for a judicial examination and determination of the validity of the power of the Agency to
issue revenue allocation bonds pursuant to the Local Economic Development Act (the "Act") and
to execute certain agreements for the purpose of financing an urban renewal project to build
Riverside Park, within the urban renewal revenue allocation area in the city of Rexburg. The
Riverside Park project is a public recreational facility as described on page 7. Repayment of the
bonds is secured by revenue allocation financing, as permitted by the Act. Respondent/Appellant
Kenneth W. Hart (hereafter "Hart") claims revenue allocation financing is unconstitutional pursuant
to ID Const. Article VIII, §§ 3 and 4 and article XII, §4.
The Agency contends, as an independent public body corporate and politic created by the
Idaho Legislature, it is not an entity subject to the limitations set forth in ID Const. Article VIII,§§ 3
and 4 and Article XII, §4. Consequently, the Agency is authorized to issue revenue allocation bonds.
Hart appeals from the judgment granting the Agency's Petition for Judicial Confirmation.

B.

Course of Proceedings.
The Agency generally agrees with Hart's course of proceedings except as set forth herein.
The District Court's Memorandum Decision filed May 8, 2008, held there was no
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constitutional or statutory violation and the Agency had the power to issue the revenue allocation
bonds. (R., Vol. 1, p. 133.)
The District Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree
on May 29, 2008 (the "Judgment"). (R., Vol. I, p. 136.) Hart filed his Notice of Appeal on June
18, 2008. (R., Vol. I, p. 148.) Therein, Hart indicated he was appealing from the District Court's
Memorandum Decision dated May 8, 2008. (Id.) On or about July 8, 2008, Hart filed his Amended
Notice of Appeal, which for all purposes is identical to the original Notice of Appeal. Hart is
appealing from the Judgment, as opposed to the Memorandum Decision. (Appellant's Brief, p. 1.)
Numerous issues were not challenged by Hart. The District Court concluded "[a]ll issues
raised by the Agency, but not specifically objected to by Mr. Hart are deemed to be admitted by Mr.
Hart." (R., Vol. I, p. 144, ,r 1.) The District Court granted the Agency's Petition in its entirety. (R.,
Vol.I, p.146, ifl.)
Although Hart evidenced an intent to appeal the District Court's decision holding the bonds
did not mature after the life of the urban renewal plan in violation of LC. § 50-2904 (2008)1,
Appellant has expressly abandoned that issue. (Appellant's Brief, pg. 1.) Therefore, this statutory
issue will not be addressed in this brief.
The Agency notes the issue regarding whether revenue allocation financing is
unconstitutional pursuant to Article VIII, § 4 and Article XII, § 4, was not specifically raised below;

1

Citation and quotation throughout this brief reflect the most current codification, unless
otherwise noted.
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however, the Agency will present argument on this issue as Hart addressed this issue in his briefing.

C.

Statement of Facts.
The Agency generally agrees with Hart's Statement of Facts except as set forth herein.
1.

The Urban Renewal Law and the Local Economic Development Act.

In 1965, the Idaho Legislature authorized local governments to establish an urban renewal
agency for the purpose of redeveloping deteriorated or deteriorating areas of individual
municipalities. The Idaho Urban Renewal Law, Title 50, Chapter 20, Idaho Code (the "Law").

In 1988, the Idaho Legislature passed the Local Economic Development Act, Title 50,
Chapter 29, Idaho Code (the "Act"), authorizing revenue allocation financing for purposes of
financing the objectives set forth under the Law. Revenue allocation, or "tax increment," financing,
simply explained, freezes property tax assessment within a described area as of a certain date. Any
increase in the assessed value is allocated to urban renewal agencies. This financing tool allows
urban renewal agencies to finance projects within their communities based on the increases in
property value that result from the redevelopment itself. To date, forty-nine states, excluding
Arizona, and the District of Columbia have statutory mechanisms for tax increment or revenue
allocation financing.
The Act does not provide urban renewal agencies with taxing authority, but allows such
agencies to issue bonds to achieve its objectives. The Act's primary purpose is to create financing
for "the economic growth and development of urban renewal areas."
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It is hereby found and declared that there exists in municipalities a need to raise
revenue to finance the economic growth and development of urban renewal areas
.... The purpose of this act is to provide for the allocation of a portion of the
property taxes levied against taxable property located in a revenue allocation area for
a limited period of time to assist in the financing of urban renewal plans, to
encourage private development in urban renewal areas ... to prevent or arrest the
decay of urban areas due to the inability of existing financing methods to promote
needed public improvements, to encourage taxing districts to cooperate in the
allocation of future tax revenues arising in urban areas ... in order to facilitate the
long-term growth of their common tax base, and to encourage private investment
within urban areas .... The foregoing purposes are hereby declared to be valid
public purposes for municipalities.
LC. § 50-2902.
The Act authorizes municipalities to adopt revenue allocation provisions or amend their
original urban renewal plans to permit revenue allocation financing as follows, in pertinent part:
An authorized municipality is hereby authorized and empowered to adopt, at any
time, a revenue allocation financing provision, as described in this chapter, as part
of an urban renewal plan .... A revenue allocation financing provision may be
adopted either at the time of the original adoption of an urban renewal plan ... or
thereafter as a modification of an urban renewal plan .... Urban renewal plans
existing prior to the effective date of this section may be modified to include a
revenue allocation financing provision.
LC. § 50-2904.
"Authorized municipality'' or "municipality" means: "any county or incorporated city which
has established an urban renewal agency ...." LC. § 50-2903(3). "Revenue allocation area" means:
that portion of an urban renewal area ... the equalized assessed valuation (as shown
by the taxable property assessment rolls) of which the local governing body has
determined, on and as a part of an urban renewal plan, is likely to increase as a result
of the initiation of an urban renewal project . . . . The base assessment roll or rolls
of revenue allocation area or areas shall not exceed at any time ten percent (10%) of
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the current assessed valuation of all taxable property within the municipality.
J.C. § 50-2903(15).
Following enactment of an ordinance adopting a revenue allocation provision, the urban
renewal agency is required to create a fund for the deposit ofrevenue allocation proceeds:
Upon enactment of an ordinance adopting a revenue allocation financing provision
as part of an urban renewal plan, the urban renewal agency shall create a special fund
or funds to be used for the purposes enumerated in this chapter. The revenues
allocated to the urban renewal agency pursuant to this chapter, shall be paid to the
agency by the treasurer of the county in which the revenue allocation district is
located and shall be deposited by the agency into one (1) or more of such special
funds.
LC. § 50-2908(3).
Hart incorrectly states tax increment revenue is allocated to the Agency by the City of
Rexburg. As required by statute, the revenues allocated to the Agency are paid to the Agency by the
County Treasurer. See, LC. § 50-2908(3). It is the decision of the Legislature, not the City, County

'
or other taxing entities, to allocate such funds to the Agency.
The Act specifically authorizes the urban renewal agency to issue bonds payable solely from
the fund established pursuant to statute. LC. § 50-2909(1 ). While an agency is obligated to repay
any indebtedness incurred, the obligation is incurred only to the extent "the moneys are available in
a special fund or funds established under section 50-2908, Idaho Code .... " LC. § 50-2909(2). The
Act expressly provides agency bonds do not constitute a general obligation or debt of any
municipality, the state or any of its political subdivisions, "or the pledging of faith and credit within
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the meaning of any constitutional or statutory debt limitation or restriction." LC. § 50-2910. The
Law provides the same. LC. § 50-2012(b). The Agency does not have authority to levy or collect
taxes, to encumber the general fund of the governing body or any other taxing entity, or to compel
the city or any other taxing entity to levy taxes.
2.

History of the City ofRexburg's Adoption of Revenue Allocation Financing and
Judicial Confirmation Action.

As noted in Hart's brief, the appeal does not challenge the procedural steps taken by the City
of Rexburg and the Agency to comply with the Law, the Act and the Judicial Confirmation Law.
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 2-3.) Furthermore, the appeal does not challenge the use of the judicial
confirmation process for purposes of obtaining an early resolution of the bond issues. Since there
is no factual dispute as to any of the aforementioned procedural steps, the facts as set forth in the
record are firmly established. (R., Vol. 1, pp.38-51.)
The Agency was created consistent with the provisions of the Law on November 6, 1991.
(R., Vol. 1, pp. 38-39, Ex. !.) Thereafter, the North Highway Urban Renewal Plan (the "Plan") was
created including a revenue allocation financing provision. (R., Vol. I, p. 39, Ex. 1.) The Plan was
amended in 1998 and 2005. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 39-41, Exs. 2-7.) The City Council adopted Ordinance
No. 950 on December 21, 2005, approving the Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan
and made certain findings. (R., Vol. 1, p. 41, Ex. 8.) City Ordinance No. 950 specifically found the
Project Area as defined by the Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan was a
deteriorated or deteriorating area as defined by the Law. (Id.)
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On November 21 and November 28, 2007, the Agency published its Notice of Negotiated
Private Bond Sale and Notice of Bond Purchase Agreement in the Standard Journal, notifying the
public of its negotiation for and private sale to Zions Bank Public Finance of approximately
$6,300,000 of Revenue Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds, Series 2008 (the "Series 2008 Bonds"),
for improvements, authorized by the Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan and its
intent to enter into a Bond Purchase Agreement with Zions Bank Public Finance. (R., Vol. I, pp. 4142, Ex. 11.)
On December 4, 2007, the Board of Commissioners ("Board") of the Agency adopted
Resolution No. 2007-4, approving the Bond Purchase Agreement with Zions Bank Public Finance.
(R., Vol. 1, p. 42, Ex. 12.)
The project is defined in Section 2.1 of Resolution No. 2007-4 as follows:
The Riverside Park Urban Renewal Project (the "Project") to be financed from the
proceeds of the [Series 2008] Bonds shall consist of (1) acquisition of land and
construction of a public outdoor swimming facility, including dressing facilities,
access road, parking facilities, and related furnishings and improvements;
construction and furnishing of a building for sporting and community events;
installation ofoutdoor fields for soccer, football, baseball, and other public recreation
purposes, and related improvements; (2) deposit of funds into the Debt Service
Reserve Fund in an amount sufficient to meet the Reserve Fund Requirement; and
(3) payment of the reasonable and necessary Costs ofissuance of the Bonds .... The
total cost of the Project is estimated to be not to exceed $6,300,000, which shall be
paid from the proceeds of the Bonds.
(R., Vol. 1, pp. 42-43, Ex. 12, p. 9.)
On December 12, 2007, the Agency caused to be published a notice indicating passage of
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Agency Resolution No. 2007-4. (R., Vol. 1, p. 43, Ex. 13.)
Resolution No. 2007-4 includes, by exhibit, the Bond Purchase Agreement (the "Purchase
Agreement") between the Agency and Zions Bank Public Finance (the "Underwriters"). (R., Vol.
1, p. 43, Ex. 12.) The Purchase Agreement requires the Agency to obtain a judgment confirming the
validity of: (1) the Agency's authority under the Constitution and the laws of Idaho to issue the
Series 2008 Bonds; (2) the Series 2008 Bonds, when issued, will be valid and enforceable in
accordance with their terms; and, (3) the Purchase Agreement will be valid and enforceable in
accordance with their terms. (Id.) The Agency must also obtain an approving unqualified opinion
of Bond Counsel. (Jd.)
The Agency is required to tender funds from revenue allocation proceeds to the Revenue
Allocation Fund. (R., Vol. 1, p. 43, Ex. 12, p. 14.) The proceeds deposited therein shall be used only
for the following purposes and in the following order of priority: first, to pay the interest accruing
on the Series 2008 Bonds and any Additional Bonds by required deposits into the Bond Fund;
second, to pay the principal of the Series 2008 Bonds and any Additional Bonds payable within the
next Bond Year by required deposits into the Bond Fund; third, to fund the Debt Service Reserve
Fund by required deposits thereto, if any; fourth, to fund the Administration Fund; fifth, for any other
lawful purpose of the Agency. (Id.)
On February 12, 2008, the Agency adopted and passed Resolution No. 2008-1, authorizing
the filing of a judicial confirmation action. (R., Vol. 1, p. 45, Ex. 15.) On February 13, 2008, the
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Agency filed its Petition for Judicial Confirmation. (R., Vol.1, p. 45, Ex. 16.) Thereafter, the Clerk
of the Court issued a Notice of Filing of Petition for Judicial Confirmation scheduling the hearing
on the Petition for March 17, 2008. (R., Vol. 1, p. 45, Ex. 17.) The Agency then caused the Notice
to be posted in the appropriate locations and published in the Standard Journal, all in compliance
with LC.§ 7-1306. The Court re-scheduled the hearing to March 31, 2008. (R., Vol. 1, p. 29.) The
Agency then caused a Supplemental Notice of Filing of Petition for Judicial Confirmation and
Revised Hearing Date to be posted and published in compliance with LC.§ 7-1306. (R., Vol.1, pp.
127(a)-(d).) The hearing was held as scheduled on March 31, 2008, before the Honorable Brent J.
Moss.
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
The "Issues on Appeal" listed in Appellant's brief are accurately set forth therein.
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
The Agency requests it be awarded attorney fees incurred in defending this appeal pursuant
to LA.R. 41 and LC.§ 12-121, which provide authority for an award of attorney fees when this Court
finds the appeal was "brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation." LR.C.P. 54(e)(l). Where an appeal turns on questions of law, a case is considered
frivolously appealed "if the law is well settled and the appellant has made no substantial showing
that the district court misapplied the law." Andrews v. Idaho Forest Industries, Inc., 117 Idaho 195,
198, 786 P.2d 586, 589 (Ct. App. 1990) (additional citations omitted). Here, Hart failed to show how
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the District Court misapplied well settled law on the constitutional and alter ego issues.

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review on Appeal.
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of!aw, over which this Court exercises de nova

review. Doe Iv. Doe, 138 Idaho 893, 903, 71 P.3d 1040, 1050 (2003)(additional citations omitted).
The party challenging a statute on constitutional grounds bears the burden of establishing that the
statute is unconstitutional and "must overcome a strong presumption of validity." Id. An appellate
court is obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that will uphold its constitutionality. Id.
Every reasonable presumption must be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. State

v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 707, 711, 518 P.2d 969, 973 (1974). The legislature is presumed to have acted
within its constitutional power. Worthen v. State, 96 Idaho 175, 179, 525 P.2d 957, 961 (1974).
The party challenging a statute on constitutional grounds must show the statute is
unconstitutional on "on its face" or "as applied." Am. Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dept.

Water Res., 143 Idaho 862, 870, 154 P.3d 433,441 (2007) (citations omitted). A facial challenge
requires a showing that the statute in question is unconstitutional in all applications and is purely a
question of law. Id. By contrast, an "as applied" challenge requires a showing that the statute is
unconstitutional as applied to the offending conduct. Id. Due to the variable burden of proof on the
two challenges, both types of challenges may be heard in the same matter, but the analysis of the two
challenges cannot be combined into a "hybrid" test. Id. at 871, 154 P.3d at 442 (citation omitted).
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Hart failed to distinguish between the two types ofchallenges, thus seeking an impermissible
hybrid analysis. Hart has not properly raised the "as-applied" argument because he is not asserting
that revenue allocation financing is unconstitutional as applied to the Riverside Park Project; rather,
he argues that revenue allocation is unconstitutional in all applications. As fully argued below, the
facial challenge fails because Hart cannot establish that no set of circumstances exists under which
revenue allocation financing would be valid.

B.

The Idaho Legislature Has Plenary Authority to Legislate All Matters Not Expressly
Prohibited by the Idaho Constitution.

1.

The Local Economic Development Act Is a Constitutional Exercise of the
Legislature's Plenary Power to Adopt Legislation.

In reliance upon earlier decisions by this Court, the Idaho Court of Appeals has stated:
[T]he Idaho Constitution grants the Idaho Legislature plenary authority to legislate
in all matters except those matters prohibited or limited by the Idaho Constitution.
Accordingly, unless a prohibition is found in the Idaho Constitution, the Idaho
legislature has plenary authority to legislate on any subject.
Flores v. State, 109 Idaho 182, 183, 706 P.2d 71, 72 (Ct.App. 1985) (citations omitted); accord, St.
Joe Improvement Co. v. Laumierster, 19 Idaho 66, 112 P. 683,684 (1910) ("It must be remembered
that the Legislature has plenary power in all matters of legislation except where prohibited by the
Constitution."). The Court also gives great deference to the Legislature's policy determinations. See
Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635,640, 778 P.2d 757, 762 (1989).
Hart argues the provisions of the Act violate the Idaho Constitution's limitation on municipal
debt and the lending of credit provisions. Nothing in Article VIII, §§ 3 and 4 or Article XII, § 4,
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limits the Legislature's authority to adopt the financing mechanism contained in the Act. By their
express terms, those sections are limitations on counties, cities, school boards, and certain state
subdivisions which possess authority to levy taxes and make full faith and credit pledges-nowhere
is there any reference to urban renewal agencies or other non-taxing districts or authorities. In the
absence of an express intent that these constitutional provisions apply to non-taxing public entities
like urban renewal agencies, the Legislature was well within its plenary authority when it adopted
the Act. Absent such express prohibition, this Court should uphold the plenary authority of the
Legislature and defer to its policy determination that revenue allocation is important to the economic
welfare of the State of Idaho and therefore uphold the Act.

2.

The Legislature is Presumed to Have Knowledge of the Existing Judicial
Decisions Prior to the Adoption of the Act.

In 1965, the Legislature passed the Law setting out the authority of urban renewal agencies.

In 1972, the Supreme Court found urban renewal agencies were not political subdivisions, or an alter
ego of the local governing body, subject to Article VIII, §§ 3 and 4 or Article XII, § 4; Boise

Redevelopment Agency v. YickKong Corp., 94 Idaho 876, 882-883, 499 P.2d 575, 581-582 (1972).
In 1988, approximately 16 years after this Court's decision in YickKong, the Legislature adopted the
Act designating a source of revenue to achieve the urban renewal objectives set forth in the Law
namely, taxes generated from increased assessed property values, if and when experienced.
The Court must construe a statute under the assumption that when the Legislature enacts or
amends a statute it has full knowledge of the existing judicial decisions and case law of the state at
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the time the statute was passed. George W Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 53 7, 540, 797
P.2d 1385, 1388 (1990) (citations omitted). "The legislature is presumed not to intend to overturn
long established principles oflaw unless an intention to do so plainly appears by express declaration
or the language employed admits ofno other reasonable construction." McCann v. McCann, 138
Idaho 228,236, 61 P .3d 585,593 (2002) (citations omitted). Accordingly the presumption is that the
Legislature was aware of Yick Kong when the Act was adopted. 2
The 1988 adoption of the Act does not impact the holding of Yick Kong as it is based on the
lack of power of the agency to levy taxes and encumber city resources. The Act still does not provide
an agency with taxing authority, but allows the agency to issue bonds for the purposes set forth in
the Law. In short, the Act does not authorize a direct pledge of tax revenues, but merely a
requirement of an appropriation from any available funds. The legal commitment to allocate such
funds does not implicate the purpose of the constitutional limitations because the agency does not
have taxing authority.

C.

The Agency Lacks Authority to Levy or Collect Taxes, Encumber the General Fund,
or Compel a Local Governing Body or Other Taxing Entity to Levy Taxes; Therefore,
Article VIII, §§ 3 and 4 and Article XII,§ 4 Were Not Intended to Apply to the Agency.
Article VIII, § 3 expressly identifies four entities affected by the debt limitation: counties,

2

It is also presumed the Legislature was aware of the holdings of the following cases:

Lloyd v. Twin Falls Housing Authority, 62 Idaho 592, 113 P.2d 1102 (1941); State v. State Bd. of
Education, 56 Idaho 210, 52 P.2d 141, (1935); Wood v. Boise Junior College Dormitory Housing
Commission, 81 Idaho 379,342 P.2d 700 (1959); Barker v. Wagner, 96 Idaho 214, 526 P.2d 174
(1974); Board ofCounty Comm 'rs of Twin Falls County v. Idaho Health Facilities Authority, 96
Idaho 498,531 P.2d 588 (1974).
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cities, boards of education, and school districts. The text of Article VIII, § 4 similarly identifies six
affected entities: counties, cities, towns, townships, boards of education, and school districts. In both
sections, the enumerated list is followed by the phrase "other subdivision." Hart argues an urban
renewal district falls within this category. The Idaho Supreme Court has frequently held "where
general words of a statute follow an enumeration of persons or things, such general words will be
construed as meaning persons or things of like or similar class or character to those specially
enumerated." Pepple v. Headrick, 64 Idaho 132, 128 P.2d 757, 760-61 (1942). This rule of
construction is frequently referred to as the 'ejusdem generis' rule. Id. Thus, "other subdivision" can
only be construed to mean entities with characteristics similar to those enumerated.
The enumerated entities are vested with the power to levy taxes, a power not given to urban
renewal agencies. In Yick Kong the Supreme Court examined the debt limitations found in these
sections and held that "the questioned authority [the Boise Redevelopment Agency] has no powers
of taxation and therefore the provisions of Article 8 [sic], Section 3 do not apply." 94 Idaho at 88283, 499 P .2d at 581-82. The Supreme Court has employed the same reasoning to find that irrigation
districts, housing authorities, and public health entities-which do not have the power to levy taxesare not subject to the constitutional debt limitations. See Lloyd v. Twin Falls Housing Authority, 62
Idaho 592, 113 P.2d 1102 (1941); State v. State Bd. ofEducation, 56 Idaho 210, 52 P.2d 141 (1935);
Wood v. Boise Junior College Dormitory Housing Commission, 81 Idaho 379, 342 P .2d 700 (1959);
Barker v. Wagner, 96 Idaho 214,526 P.2d 174 (1974); Board of County Comm'rs of Twin Falls
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County v. Idaho Health Facilities Authority, 96 Idaho 498, 531 P.2d 588 (1974).
This Court's precedent strongly suggests the presence or absence of taxing authority is the
primary, if not sole, indicia by which the Court determines whether an entity is subject to the
constitutional debt limitations. E.g., State Bd. ofEducation, 56 Idaho at 215, 52 P .2d at 143. ("There
is another reason why it is evident to us that it (Art. VIII, § 3) was not intended ... to include the
Regents of the University, and that is: The regents have not and never had any taxing power; they
could not levy or collect taxes of any kind and were not and are not representatives of any
municipality, territory, subdivision, or taxing unit of the state in any respect.") (emphasis added). By
contrast, this Court has held that Highway Districts-entities which do have the power to levy and
apply ad valorem taxes for purposes authorized by law-are bound by Article VIII' s debt limitation.
LC. § 40-1309; see also Allen v. Doumecq Highway Dist., 33 Idaho 249, 192 P. 662 (1920).
In Barker v. Wagner, the Court held "Art. VIII, § 3 does not apply to irrigation districts." 96
Idaho at 217,526 P.2d at 177. The Court reasoned that because the drafters of the Constitution
specifically identified four entities covered by the debt limitation, "the characteristics of the four
enumerated entities must be compared with the characteristics of irrigation districts to determine if
it was intended that irrigation districts be subject to the limitations of Art. VIII,§ 3." Id. at 218, 526
P.2d at 178. In that case, the relevant statute authorized irrigation districts to issue bonds which
"shall be payable solely out of a special fund into which the irrigation district shall deposit: (1) The
collection ofbenefit assessments levied by the irrigation district; (2) Payments pursuant to contracts

PETITIONER/RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 15

entered into with other public or private irrigation entities; (3) The proceeds from the sale or use of
falling water for power production." Id. at 215, 526 P.2d at 175. In contrast to the limited sources
of revenue available to irrigation districts, "[T]he four enumerated entities possess general
governmental powers in the sense that their regulations and taxation apply to all persons located
within their geographical boundaries." Id. at 218,526 P.2d at 178. The Court then found that "Art.
VIII,§ 3 speaks in terms of taxes and since benefit assessments [the method ofrevenue generation
used by the irrigation districts] are not taxes," the debt limitation does not apply to irrigation
districts. Id.
In Lloyd v. Twin Falls Housing Authority, this Court determined a housing authority was not
subject to the Constitution's debt limitation. 62 Idaho at 600, 113 P.2d at 1105. The Court examined
the statutory provision stating that "[N]othing in this Act or any other law shall be construed as
authorizing a housing authority to levy or collect taxes or assessments, to create any indebtedness
payable out of taxes or assessments, or in any manner to pledge the credit of the city, the county, the
State or any subdivision thereof." Id. at 598, 113 P .2d at 1104. Because the housing authority
"cannot make a provision for the collection of an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest on its
indebtedness as it falls due ... ," the Court was able to find that the housing authority "is not a
county, city, town, township, board of education, or school district, or other subdivision of the state
within the meaning of Article VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution, and the prohibition expressed in
that section does not apply to it." Id.
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In Board ofCounty Comm 'rs o/Twin Falls County v. Idaho Health Facilities Authority, the
Court considered whether the financial obligations of the health authority were constrained by
Article VIII, § 3. 96 Idaho at 498, 531 P.2d at 588. By statute the health authority could not
encumber "the state, the legislature thereof, or ... any county, city, township, board of education or
school district, or other subdivision of the state" with its debts. Id. at 503, 531 P .2d at 593 citing I. C.
§ 39-1451. The Court cited Lloyd and Yick Kong, stating "[I]n analogous situations [we] have
concluded that obligations of the kind involved in this case, where the public entity created has no
power to tax or encumber the assets of the body creating it, are not violative of the constitutional
restrictions of Article 8." Id. at 504, 531 P.2d at 594.
Similar to the statutory schemes addressed by this Court in Lloyd and Idaho Health Facilities

Authority, the Legislature expressly stated the obligations incurred by the Agency do not constitute
general obligations or debts of the City under the Act. I.C. § 50-2910. That principle is affirmed by
the Law in LC.§ 50-2012(b). The Legislature was acting within its plenary power to enact legislation
authorizing the creation of non-taxing entities not subject to the constitutional debt constraints and
Article VIII, §§ 3 and 4 do not apply to urban renewal agencies.

D.

Revenue Allocation Bonds Do Not Violate the Voter Approval Requirement for the
Issuance of Debt Set Forth In Article VIII, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution.
Hart argues the Act violates Article VIII, § 3 ofthe Idaho Constitution because voter approval

is not required "for the purpose of approving said indebtedness or liability of the city of Rexburg in
funding- pledging its credit - to the Agency for issuance of the bonds." (Appellant's Brief, pg. 7.)
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Article VIII, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution states, in pertinent part:
No county, city, board of education, or school district, or other subdivision of the
state, shall incur any indebtedness, or liability, in any manner, or for any purpose,
exceeding in that year, the income and revenue provided for it for such year, without
the assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors thereof voting at an election to be
held for that purpose ....
ID CONST. art. VIII,§ 3.
This provision bars enumerated entities from incurring any indebtedness or liability without
voter approval unless the proposed undertaking is an ordinary and necessary expense. 3 Id. Revenue
allocation bond financing by the Agency raises three categories of issues under Article VIII, § 3 of
the Idaho Constitution: (1) whether bonds payable from and secured by incremental tax revenues
constitute "indebtedness" or "liability''; (2) whether the Agency is the 'alter ego' of the City; and (3)
whether the Agency is one of the enumerated governmental entities.
1.

Revenue Allocation Bonds Do Not Constitute "Indebtedness" or "Liability" for
Purposes of Article VIII, § 3, of the Idaho Constitution.

The revenue allocation bonds do not obligate the general funds ofthe City or any other taxing
entity, the Agency does not have the power to levy or collect taxes, or to compel the City or any other
taxing entity to levy taxes. Pursuant to the Act, the Agency receives an allocated portion of tax
revenues from the County Treasurer. Indeed, the language of Article VIII, § 3 has been construed
3

As noted in Hart's brief, the Agency did not petition for judicial confirmation based
upon the "ordinary and necessary" clause of Article VIII,§ 3. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 6-7.) In fact,
the "ordinary and necessary" clause is not applicable to the Agency because the Agency is not an
entity subject to the constitutional requirements of voter approval. See Yick Kong, 94 Idaho at
882-83, 499 P .2d at 581-82.
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narrowly:

It must be clear to the ordinary mind, on reading [Article VIII, §3], that the framers
of the Constitution meant to cover all kinds and character of debts and obligations
for which a city may become bound, and to preclude circuitous and evasive methods
of incurring debts and obligations to be met by the city or its inhabitants.
Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 P. 643,649 (1912) (emphasis added) (superseded
by statute Article VIII,§ 3). The intent of the framers was clear: Article VIII, § 3 is meant to prohibit
all debts over and above the income and revenue for that year, for which a city. or other enumerated
entity under that section, may become bound, without a vote of the taxpayers who will directly or
indirectly bear the burden of that municipal debt.
By statute, the Agency is obligated to repay any indebtedness incurred; however, the
obligation is incurred only to the extent "the moneys are available in a special fund or funds
established under section 50-2908, Idaho Code .... " LC. § 50-2909(2). Furthermore, the bonds do
not constitute the general obligation of the City, or any other taxing entity, or a pledge of the City's
faith and credit within the meaning of any constitutional or statutory debt limitation or restriction:
The bonds issued and other obligations incurred by any agency under this chapter
shall not constitute a general obligation or debt of any municipality, the state or any
of its political subdivisions. In no event shall such bonds or other obligations give
rise to general obligation or liability of the agency, the municipality, the state, or any
of its political subdivisions, or give rise to a charge against their general credit or
taxing powers, or be payable out of any funds or properties other than the special
fund or funds of the agency pledged therefor; and such bonds and other obligations
shall so state on their face. Such bonds and other obligations shall not constitute an
indebtedness or the pledging of faith and credit within the meaning of any
constitutional or statutory debt limitation or restriction.
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LC. § 50-2910. Similarly, the Law further expressly provides that such bonds are not the debt of the
municipality:
Bonds issued under this section shall not constitute an indebtedness within the
meaning of any constitutional or statutory debt limitation or restriction, and shall not
be subject to the provisions of any other law or charter relating to the authorization,
issuance or sale of bonds. Bonds and other obligations of an urban renewal agency
(and such bonds and obligations shall so state on their face) shall not be a debt of the
municipality, the state or any political subdivision thereof, and neither the
municipality, the state nor any political subdivision thereof shall be liable thereon,
nor in any event shall such bonds or obligations be payable out of any funds other
than those of said urban renewal agency.
LC. § 50-2012(b). The bond expressly provides on its face it is not a prohibited debt or obligation
of the Agency or the City:
This Bond shall not constitute an indebtedness within the meaning of any
Constitutional or statutory debt limitation or restriction, and shall not constitute a
general obligation or debt of the City of Rexburg, Idaho, or of any municipality, the
State ofldaho, or any of its political subdivisions. In no event shall this Bond give
rise to a general obligation or liability of the Agency, any municipality, the State of
Idaho, or any of its political subdivisions, or give rise to a charge against their general
credit or taxing powers, or be payable out of any funds or properties other than those
of the Agency specifically pledged therefor.

An analysis of the meaning or the scope of "indebtedness" or "liability" under Article
VIII, § 3 is not necessary because the Agency's revenue allocation financing bonds are debts or
liabilities of the Agency, not the City. The Agency does not have the authority or power to encumber
the general funds of the City, to levy or collect taxes, or to compel the City or any other taxing entity
to levy taxes. Furthermore, the City of Rexburg has not "guaranteed" the debts of the Agency.
Therefore, the "evils" sought to be prevented by the Constitutional Drafters in Article VIII, § 3 do
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not exist in this case because the obligations of the Agency do not fall on the taxpayer.
It is now settled Idaho law that voters must approve both general obligation bonds (secured
by the full faith and credit of the issuer) and "revenue bonds" (secured only by a pledge ofa special
fund) issued by one of the enumerated governmental entities. Asson v. City ofBurley, l 05 Idaho 432,
670 P.2d 839(1983),cert. denied, ChemicalBankv. Asson, 469U.S. 870,105 S.Ct. 219, 83 L.Ed.2d
149 (1984); Feil, 23 Idaho 32, 129 P. 643; City ofBoise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho I, 137 P.3d 388 (2006)
(Bush, J., pro tern, specially concurring).
Contrary to Hart's assertions, however, there is a distinction between "revenue bonds" and
"revenue allocation bond financing." The latter is not a "special fund" case. In Asson, the Idaho
Supreme Court reaffirmed its long-standing rejection of the "special fund" doctrine to overcome the
debt limitation ofthe Idaho Constitution. Adopted in the majority of other jurisdictions, that doctrine
holds "a municipality does not contract indebtedness or incur liability, within the constitutional
limitation, by undertaking an obligation which is to be paid out of a special fund consisting entirely
of revenue or income from the property purchased or constructed." Asson, 105 Idaho at 438,670
P.2d at 845 (emphasis added).
The idea behind the "special fund" doctrine is property purchased/constructed by the
municipality will generate enough revenue to pay for itself. That generated revenue is put in a special
fund and is used only for that particular, identified purpose. The incremental tax revenue allocated
by the County Treasurer to the Agency is required by statute to be deposited in a "special fund or
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funds,"but those funds may be used for the purposes identified in the Act. LC. § 50-2908(3). In sum,
the "special fund" doctrine is not applicable to revenue allocation bond financing. The special fund
created by the Act is not a mechanism to evade the Idaho Constitution, rather, the source of an
agency's revenue to pay project costs.
Other jurisdictions have considered and held revenue allocation bonds are not prohibited
"indebtedness" or "liability" requiring voter approval. The Utah Supreme Court relied upon the
provisions of the revenue allocation statute, which specifically provided tax increment bonds were
not a debt or obligation of the city, county, state or any of its political subdivisions, in holding the
bonds were not a city debt or obligation contrary to the Utah Constitution. Tribe v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 540 P .2d 499, 503 (Utah 197 5). The court noted the bondholders could "look only to revenues

from the operation of the facility and the allocated taxes, for retirement of the bond obligation." Id.
Idaho's Act contains provisions similar to those addressed by the Utah court in Tribe. For
example, Idaho's statute specifically provides revenue allocation bonds are not a debt or obligation
of any municipality, the state or any of its political subdivisions. LC. § 50-2910. Additionally,
bondholders may look only to the allocated taxes for retirement of the bond obligation. LC. § 502909( 1). Consequently, the bonds allowed under Idaho's statute do not provide for city indebtedness
or liability contrary to Article VIII, § 3.
The Florida Court in State v. Miami Beach Redevelopment Agency upheld the tax increment
financing mechanism as constitutional holding "where there is no direct pledge of ad valorem tax
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revenues, but merely a requirement of an annual appropriation from any available funds, the
referendum provision of Article VII, § 12 [of the Florida Constitution] is not involved." 392 So.2d
875, 894 (Fla. 1980). That holding was recently challenged, but was reinforced in Strand v.

Escambia County, 992 So.2d 150 (Fla. 2008).
The court noted the financing mechanism in Strand was not distinguishable from that
approved in Miami Beach. Id. at 157. Florida judicial precedent indicated that critical to the
constitutionality of the bonds was the idea the bondholder could not compel the levy of ad valorem
taxation. Id. at 157-59. The court also recognized under the tax increment financing statutes the only
obligation of the governing bodies "is to appropriate a sum equal to any tax increment generated in
a particular year from the ordinary, general levy of ad valorem taxes otherwise made in the city and
county that year." Id. at 158.
The Strand Court analyzed the obligation of the Court under stare decisis concluding in favor
of precedent. Id. at 159-60. The court upheld Miami Beach, reasoning in part that the Miami Beach
decision had been relied on for twenty-seven years in the issuance of bond financing by local
governing bodies and was "inextricably woven into the financial fabric of our State." Id. The Court
concluded that receding from precedent would "cause serious disruption to the governmental
authorities that have relied upon that precedent for planning public works that are in various stages
of development and approval" Id. At 160.
The rationale of the court's decision in Strand is directly on point. In this case, a critical fact
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is that urban renewal agencies cannot levy or collect taxes, encumber the general fund, or compel
local governing bodies or other taxing entities to levy taxes. The bondholder cannot enforce its bond
against the taxpayer. Like Miami Beach, this Court's decision in Yick Kong has been the law on
many of the issues raised in this appeal for more than 30 years. Even though Yick Kong did not
expressly address revenue allocation financing, it has been justifiably relied on many times by
agencies and courts in confirming the validity of revenue allocation financing bonds. Moreover, Yick

Kong was the law regarding urban renewal agencies at the time the Legislature enacted the Act. As
in Florida, the well established precedent of this Court should be affirmed. The passage of the Act
by the State Legislature to allow use of revenue allocation for the purposes stated does not change
this Court's conclusion concerning the independent status of urban renewal agencies. Based on the
foregoing, revenue allocation bonds do not constitute prohibited "indebtedness" or "liability" under
Article VIII, § 3.

2.

The Agency Is Not The 'Alter Ego' of the City of Rexburg.

The only argument Hart presents justifying the need for voter approval is the alter ego issue
wherein he argues the City ofRexburg and the Agency are one and the same. Hart argues the Agency
is the alter ego of the City ofRexburg by virtue of the fact "the creation, organization, appointments,
designation of projects, and funding are totally controlled by the municipality." (Appellant's Brief,
pg. 19.) Analysis of the alter ego issue must be undertaken both in connection with the voter
approval and the lending credit provisions of the Idaho Constitution. Whether an urban renewal
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agency is the "alter ego" of a city was expressly addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court in YickKong.
Yick Kong Corporation argued the urban renewal agency's issuance of revenue bonds without voter
approval was contrary to Article VIII, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution because the urban renewal
agency was the "alter ego" of the City of Boise." Id., 94 Idaho at 880,499 P.2d at 579.
The Court concluded the agency was not the "alter ego" of the City of Boise because the
degree of the city's control over the agency did not compromise the agency's independence. Id. at
882, 499 P .2d at 581. The Court reasoned: (1) the agency was an entity oflegislative creation, which
established the agency's powers, duties, and authorities; (2) the legislature intended there to be a
local voice in the determination of whether a municipality needed urban renewal and in the selection
of the commissioners; (3) "[w)hile the particular city may trigger the existence of the (agency], it
cannot control its powers or operations"; (4) the appointment procedures did not cause inherent
control in the city; and (5) the removal procedures were not solely in the discretion of the city. Id.
at 881-82, 499 P .2d at 580-81. The Court held "[t]he degree of control exercised by the City of Boise
does not usurp the powers and duties of the [agency], and the close association between the two
entities at most shows two independent public entities closely cooperating for valid public purposes."

Id., at 882,499 P.2d at 581.
This Court reached a similar result in Wood v. Boise Jr. College Dormitory Housing

Commission, holding the dormitory housing commission was not the alter ego of the junior college
district. 81 Idaho 379,384,342 P.2d 700. As in YickKong, the court focused on the degree of control
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between the two entities. Id.
As required by the statute, the housing commission could not act until the trustees declared
there was a need for housing; the two entities could share employees; the housing commissioners
could be removed by complaint of the district trustees; the district had supervision over the students;
rents to be charged by the housing commission should be comparable with those of other junior
college rental facilities; the housing commissioners conferred and cooperated with the district
trustees; the housing commission must file a financial report with the clerk of the district; and upon
payment of the obligations, the property should be transferred to the college district. Id. at 383, 342
P.2d at 702.
The court held the interrelated activities of the housing commissions and the junior college
districts were not of such quality, character, and control as to indicate the housing commission was
the alter ego of the college district, reasoning: "In enacting legislation permitting the creation of the
housing commissions, clearly the Legislature intended a high degree of cooperation to exist between
the junior college districts and the housing commissions for the purpose of providing students of the
district with satisfactory housing." Id. at 384, 342 P.2d at 702. Therefore, the Court found the
statutes authorizing the housing commission to issue bonds and incur indebtedness were
constitutional under Article VIII, § 3. Id. at 384, 342 P.2d at 703.
Hart argues the post-Yick Kong amendment to LC. § 50-2006 in 1976, allowing the local
governing body to appoint and designate itself as the board of commissioners of the urban renewal

PETITIONER/RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 26

agency, and the amendment to LC. § 50-2017 in 1986, repealing language which prohibited
commissioners of the urban renewal agency from holding any other public office under the
municipality, create a situation where the agency is now the alter ego of the city, thereby, rendering
this Court's decision on the alter ego issue in Yick Kong no longer viable.
Despite the subsequent amendments to LC. §§ 50-2006 and 50-2017, the principles of Yick
Kong remain binding authority. Yick Kong turned on the limitations ofthe appointment and removal
procedures. 94 Idaho at 882, 499 P .2d at 581. This Court reasoned the appointment procedures did
not cause inherent control in the city, and the removal procedures were not arbitrary or solely in the
discretion of the city. Id. The holding in Yick Kong focused on the limitations and roles of each
entity, not on who was wearing what hat. Those limitations were not altered by the amendments.
The legislature has created many other entities that use the same or a similar model. The
Housing Authorities and Cooperation Law, Title 50, Chapter 19, Idaho Code, provides a housing
authority is an independent public body corporate and politic that may not transact business or
exercise its powers until the governing body has made the requisite findings. LC. § 50-1905. Under
the housing authority laws, the mayor appoints the commissioners with the approval of the city
council; however, the mayor and city council may remove a commissioner with or without cause.
LC.§§ 50-1910 and 50-1911. Additionally, the Community Infrastructure District Act, Title 50,
Chapter 31, Idaho Code, enacted in 2008, expressly provides "[m ]embers of the governing body or
bodies at the time of formation shall serve as the district board." LC. § 50-3104 (emphasis added).
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There are numerous state entities, such as the Idaho Building Authority, where commissioners are
appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate. LC. § 67-6405. Similarly, the Governor
appoints the members of the Idaho Housing and Finance Association. LC. § 67-6203. For that body,
several state elected officials and members of the Senate and House serve as advisors. The primary
inquiry is not which members or individuals serve on the various boards but, rather, what is the
authority of the entity granted by the Legislature. Thus, the holding in Yick Kong on the alter ego
issue remains binding precedent; the Agency is not the alter ego of the City of Rexburg.
Courts in California have also recognized this principle. "[A] redevelopment agency is a
separate legal entity from the city that established it, and the city is not liable for the debts of the
agency." County ofSolano v. Vallejo Redevelopment Agency, 75 Cal. App.4th 1262, 1267, 90 Cal.
Rptr.2d 41, 45 (Cal. App. 1999). In California, like Idaho, the governing body of a municipality can
declare itself to be the board of the redevelopment agency, or the board can be different from the
governing body. Cal. Health & Safety Code§ 33200 (West 2008). Nevertheless, the California court
noted that even where a city council itself acts as the board of the redevelopment agency, "the two
are separate and distinct legal entities." Long Beach Community Redevelopment Agency v. Morgan,
14 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1055, 18 Cal Rptr.2d 100 (Cal.App. 1993) (citing Pacific States Enterprises,
Inc. v. City ofCoachella, 13 Cal.App.4th 1414, 1422-25, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 68 (Cal.App. 1993)). The

court further explained that "'[w]ell-established and well-recognized case law holds that the mere
fact that the same body of officers acts as the legislative body of two different governmental entities
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does not mean that the two different governmental entities are, in actuality, one and the same."' Id.
n.4 (quoting Pacific States Enterprises, Inc., 13 Cal.App.4th at 1424, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 68) (italics in
original).
Yick Kong and the California cases hold the City and the Agency are not one and the same.

The City of Rexburg and the Agency are governed by two different bodies oflaw. The obligations
and duties owed by the officers under each body oflaw are distinct as recognized by the Act:
[T]he local governing body, ... when acting as an urban renewal agency, [shall] be
acting as an arm of state government, entirely separate and distinct from the
municipality, to achieve, perform and accomplish the public pm:poses prescribed and
provided by said urban renewal law of 1965, and as amended.
LC.§ 50-2006(b)(2) (emphasis added). If the city council is appointed and designated to the agency
board, those individuals will wear two hats. It cannot be automatically assumed simply because
officers may be the legislative body of two different governmental entities that the entities become
one and the same.
In addition to Yick Kong and Wood, the alter ego doctrine is a common law principle, most
frequently used in the context of corporate litigation. As this Court recently explained, the elements
of the doctrine are "(1) a unity of ownership to a degree that the separate personalities of the
corporation and individual no longer exist, and (2) if the acts are treated as the acts of the corporation
an inequitable result would follow." Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 556-57, 165
P.3d 261, 270-71 (2007). In other cases, the Court has described the second element as requiring a
showing that preserving the "separate existence would, under the circumstances, sanction a fraud or
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injustice." Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604,616, 114 P.3d 974,986 (2005) (citation
omitted). The common law alter ego argument has been legislatively preempted by the Law and the
Act. See I.C. §§ 50-2006 and 50-2017.
Regardless, there is no proof in the record demonstrating that Appellant satisfied either
prong. First, there is no unity of the entities regardless of who is on each board, the Agency and City
are separate entities, charged with separate duties. This distinction is clear under LC. § 502006(b)(2). Hart failed to introduce any evidence suggesting the City of Rexburg was, in any
manner, controlling or interfering with the functions of the Agency. Moreover, the facts of this case
make his argument particularly weak. While the Mayor has power to appoint the nine commissioners
(or board members) of the Agency, there is no unity of membership in this case. LC. § 502006(b)(l). (R., Vol. I, p. 19.) The Agency consists of private board members as well as one council
member and the Mayor. (R., Vol. 1, p. 19.) Thus, while there is some overlap between the City's
governing body and the Agency's, a majority of the Agency's board members are independent of the
city government. Without constituting a majority of the Agency's board, the City cannot control the
actions of the Agency. Clearly, the City of Rexburg is not usurping the powers and duties of the
Agency. See Yick Kong, 94 Idaho at 882, 499 P .2d at 581. The relationship between the Agency and
the City in this case consists entirely of permissible cooperation between "two independent public
entities" working together for "valid public purposes." Id.
Secondly, Hart did not allege nor prove that any inequity, fraud, or injustice would arise from
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maintaining the separate character of the City and the Agency. Certainly, there is no inequity for the
prospective bond holder because the nature of the financing arrangement is clearly disclosed to such
persons. See, LC; § 50-291 O; see, Municipal Building Authority ofIron County v. Lowder, 711 P .2d
273 (Utah 1985). Thus, even assuming the common law alter ego doctrine is applicable under these
circumstances, Hart failed to prove the elements.
Contrary to Hart's assertion, the Agency is not trying to evade or circumvent the prohibitions
set forth in Article VIII, § 3 of the Constitution; rather, the Agency was acting within its statutory
authority. Hart supports his argument with O 'Bryant v. City ofIdaho Falls.
0 'Bryant challenged the validity of a municipal ordinance granting a franchise to a

cooperative gas association for the construction and operation of a gas distribution system. 78 Idaho
313, 303 P .2d 672 (1956). The Cooperative was to issue bonds for the construction and operation
of the distribution system. Id. at 319,303 P.2d at 674-75. The Supreme Court held that where the
creation of the Cooperative and the ordinance granting the exclusive franchise to the Cooperative
were part of a scheme to evade and circumvent the debt limitation provisions of Article VIII, § 3,
the franchise was void. Id. at 313, 303 P.2d at 672. The Court specifically noted the Legislature had
not granted the local governing body the right to construct, operate and maintain a gas distribution
system, or to issue bonds for the construction thereof. Id. at 320,303 P.2d at 675.
The Court reviewed the corporate documents of the Cooperative and held it was not a true
cooperative association; rather, it was "an instrumentality of and controlled by the City of Idaho
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Falls." Id. at 324, P.2d at 677. Idaho Falls was expressly prohibited by Article VIII,§ 3 from issuing
debt for the purpose of constructing and maintaining the gas distribution system without voter
approval. Id. at 325, 303 P .2d at 678. The City. therefore, could not create an entity for purposes of
indirectly accomplishing that which it could not do directly. Id. The O 'Bryant case is not on point.
Here, the Legislature expressly authorized the creation ofthe Agency and expressly provided
that such independent public body corporate and politic is separate from the city and may issue long
term debt. See LC. §§ 50-2006(b)(2), 50-2012(b) and 50-2910. The Idaho Legislature has broad,
plenary authority to enact all legislation that is not otherwise expressly forbidden by the Idaho
Constitution. Flores, I 09 Idaho atl 83, 706 P .2d at 72 (citations omitted). The revenue allocation
framework set forth in the Act was adopted by the Legislature as an exercise of its plenary authority
for the express purpose of rehabilitating deteriorated and deteriorating areas and arresting urban
decay within the state, not for purposes of evading the constitutional debt constraints. Here, the
Agency acts by and under express statutory authority delegated by the Legislature. In O 'Bryant, the
City was not authorized by the Legislature to construct, operate or maintain a gas distribution system.
The Agency was clearly acting within its statutory authority and thus this case is distinguishable
from O 'Bryant.
Even if the statutory changes as to the governing body or the adoption of the Act justify
reexamination of Yick Kong, it would take this Court back to its decisions in Lloyd v. Twin Falls
Housing Authority, 62 Idaho 592,113P.2d1102 (1941); State v. State Bd. ofEducation, 56 Idaho
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210, 52 P.2d 141 (1935); Wood v. Boise Junior College Dormitory Housing Commission, 81 Idaho
379,342 P.2d 700 (1959); Barker v. Wagner, 96 Idaho 214,526 P.2d 174 (1974); Board ofCounty
Comm 'rs of Twin Falls County v. Idaho Health Facilities Authority, 96 Idaho 498, 531 P.2d 588

(1974), which still support the independent status of the Agency and its ability to issue debt outside
the limitations of Article VIII, §§ 3 and 4 and Article XII,§ 4.

3.

The Agency Is Not an Enumerated Governmental Entity Forbidden From
Issuing Debt Without Voter Approval.

The debt limitation provision of Article VIII, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution only applies to
counties, cities, boards of education, school districts, or other subdivisions of the state. Urban
renewal agencies are not among the governmental entities enumerated in Article VIII, § 3. The
enactment of the Act in 1988 does not change that determination nor does the fact the Agency is able
to use the tax increment financing tool change this Court's conclusion the Agency does not fall
within the constitutional debt limitation provision. Yick Kong, 94 Idaho at 882-83, 499 P .2d at 58182. Hart has no support for his proposition that as a result of revenue allocation financing,
"municipalities became more directly involved in the urban renewal process." (Appellant's Brief,
p. 13.) In fact, the relationship between the two independent entities does not matter for purposes of
the debt limitation argument. The reasoning set forth in Yick Kong remains sound; the close
association between the City of Rexburg and the Agency at most shows two independent public
entities closely cooperating for valid public purposes. 94 Idaho at 882, 499 P .2d at 581. There is
simply no evidence in the record supporting Hart's allegations that prior to the enactment of the Act,

PETITIONER/RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 33

urban renewal agencies were for the "most part financed by federal funds," but now are "funded
primarily by local entities." (Appellant's Brief, p. 19.) Any reexamination of the Yick Kong holding
inevitably leads to the same conclusion: an urban renewal agency is similar to other independent
authority financing entities. See YickKong, 94 Idaho 876,499 P .2d 575 (1972); Lloyd, 62 Idaho 592,
113 P.2d 1102 (1941); State Bd. ofEd., 56 Idaho 210, 52 P.2d 141 (1935); Wood, 81 Idaho 379,342
P.2d 700 (1959); Barker, 96 Idaho 214, 526 P.2d 174 (1974); Idaho Health Facilities Authority, 96
Idaho 498, 531 P.2d 588 (1974).
Further reexamination of the status of an urban renewal agency does not result in a
conclusion the Agency is one of the proscribed entities under Article VIII, § 3; but rather the Agency
meets the criteria of an Article VIII, § 1 entity. The 1998 Constitutional amendment to Article
VIII, § 1 establishes the Agency is not subject to the prohibitions of Article VIII, § 3. It provides:
This section shall not apply to liabilities incurred for ordinary operating expenses, nor
shall it apply to debts or liabilities that are repaid by the end of the fiscal year. The
debts or liabilities of independent public bodies corporate and politic created by law
and which have no power to levy taxes or obligate the general fund of the state are
not debts or liabilities of the state ofidaho. The provisions of this section shall not
make illegal those types of financial transactions that were legal on or before
November 3, 1998.
ID CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (emphasis added). This second paragraph of Article VIII, § 1 was added and
ratified in 1998. 1998 Idaho Sess. Laws 1364-65.
Urban renewal agencies are entities oflegislative creation. The Legislature determines the
agencies' powers, duties and authorities. The 1998 Constitutional amendment to Article VIII, § 1
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made it clear the limitation on public indebtedness does not apply to independent public bodies
corporate and politic created by law.4 Urban renewal agencies have no power or authority to levy
taxes or obligate the general fund; therefore, agencies are Article VIII, § 1 entities.
The Legislature has clearly classified urban renewal agencies as independent public bodies
corporate and politic created by law. LC. § 50-2006(a). The Legislature, and the people of the state
of Idaho, have provided and accepted "(t]he debts or liabilities of independent public bodies
corporate and politic created by law and which have no power to levy taxes or obligate the general
fund of the state are not debts or liabilities of the state of Idaho." ID CONST. art. VIII, § 1. The
Agency is an independent public body corporate and politic; therefore, it cannot be a city, county,
board of education, school district, or other subdivision of the state subject to the prohibitions of
Article VIII, § 3.

E.

Revenue Allocation Financing Does Not Violate Article VIII, § 4 and Article XII, § 4
of the Idaho Constitution's Prohibition Against a Governmental Entity Lending Credit.
Hart asserts the Act violates Article VIII,§ 4 and Article XII, § 4 of the Idaho Constitution

based on the mere use of tax revenues which might otherwise find their way to the City of Rexburg

4

A review of the legislative history indicates the 1998 amendment was meant to exclude
the debts and liabilities of urban renewal agencies. The testimony before the Senate State Affairs
Committee provides the purpose of the amendment, in part, is to "provide that debts and
liabilities of certain independent public bodies corporate and politic created by law are not state
debts ...." Senate State Affairs Committee minutes, February 25, 1998, p. 3. Furthermore, the
House State Affairs Committee minutes indicate the intent behind the amendment is to conform
to case law and clarify "normal operating expenses, bonds and IHA are not considered debts."
House State Affairs Committee minutes, March 18, 1998, p. 1.
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or to other taxing entities. Funds find their way to the Agency only when assessments increase as a
result of the Agency's activity. A finding concerning this point must be and was included within the
plan. LC. § 50-2905.
Hart argues the Act is unconstitutional because the revenue allocation funding mechanism
constitutes "the lending and pledging of credit and the raising of money is 'indirectly' to the benefit
ofprivate corporations, associations and interest[ s], with the agency being the conduit." (Appellant's
Brief, p. 16.) Contrary to Hart's assertions, there is nothing about the Riverside Park project which
involves aid to a private entity; therefore, Hart's abstract arguments on that point have no merit or
relevance.
Article VIII,§ 4, and Article XII,§ 4, of the Idaho Constitution prohibit governmental entities
from loaning credit to or for the benefit of private interests. YickKong, 94 Idaho at 883-84, 499 P.2d
at 582-83. The purpose of the credit clauses is to prevent private interests from gaining advantages
at the expense of the taxpayers. Id. at 884, 99 P.2d at 583. Historically, railroads and other large
businesses had succeeded in gaining the ability to indirectly impose taxes upon taxpayers; it was this
evil that was sought to be prevented by our Constitutional drafters. Id.
Aside from the requirement that public funds not be used for the primary purpose of
furthering private interests, the constitutional provisions prohibit the lending of"credit." The Idaho
Supreme Court suggests the credit clauses are implicated only when the general fund is encumbered.
"The word 'credit' as used in this provision implies the imposition of some new financial liability
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upon the State which in effect results in the creation of State debt for the benefit of private
enterprises." Engelking v. Investment Bd., 93 Idaho 217, 221-22, 458 P.2d 213, 217-18 (1969).
Revenue allocation bond financing does not violate Article VIII, § 4 or Article XII, § 4 of the
Idaho Constitution because (1) the Agency is a public entity; (2) the Agency is not an enumerated
entity subject to the prohibitions set forth in the credit clauses; and (3) proceeds of the revenue
allocation bonds are issued for the benefit of a public not private use. Section four sets forth
persuasive authority from other jurisdictions which have upheld revenue allocation financing in the
face of similar constitutional attacks.
1.

The Court's Decision in Yick Kong Remains Binding Authority for the
Proposition That the Agency Is a Public Entity.

Even with passage of the Act, the Agency remains a public entity subject to legislative
control. In Yick Kong, the Court held Article VIII, § 4 and Article XII, § 4 apply only if the
governmental entity is lending its credit to or for the benefit of private interests. 94 Idaho at 883-84,
499 P.2d at 582-83. Further, the Court held the urban renewal agency, "being a public and not a
private enterprise, does not fall within the strictures and prohibition of Article VIII, § 4 and Article
XII, § 4 of the Idaho Constitution .... " Id. at 884, 499 P.2d at 583.
The Agency's specific purpose is to aid in the development and redevelopment of
deteriorated or deteriorating areas within the city. LC. § 50-2002. The Agency's purpose did not
change with the enactment ofrevenue allocation financing. In fact, the Legislature found the purpose
of the Act to be a valid public purpose. LC. § 50-2902. Consequently, the Agency does not lend its
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credit to a private entity in violation of the Idaho Constitution. Yick Kong continues to support the
proposition the Agency is a public entity; therefore, the City of Rexburg is not lending its credit to
a private entity in violation of Article VIII, § 4, Article XII, § 4.

2.

The Agency Is Not an Enumerated Entity Subject to the "Lending Credit"
Prohibition of the Idaho Constitution.

A redevelopment agency is not specifically enumerated in Article VIII, § 4 and Article
XII, § 4, of the Idaho Constitution, but those provisions do include a catchall "other subdivision."
The Court ruled in Yick Kong that urban renewal agencies are not a "subdivision of the state" for
purposes of Article VIII, § 4 and Article XII,§ 4. 94 Idaho at 882-83, 499 P.2d at 581-82. The
Court reasoned: "[T]he [Redevelopment Agency] has no powers of taxation and therefore the
provisions of Article 8, Section 3 do not apply. Herein plaintiff has no ability to actually encumber
any of the resources of the City of Boise and cannot spend beyond its own funds and property
holdings." Id. at 882-83, 499 P.2d at 581-82 (emphasis added).
Under the aforementioned provisions, a specific concern has been the availability of the
general revenue fund to satisfy any obligation created through the lending of credit. When general
revenues are available for the repayment of obligations, the taxpayers' interests are jeopardized if
the obligation is incurred to aid a private scheme. The Agency has no general revenue power and
cannot encumber the general revenue fund in which the public has a unique interest; thus, the
Agency is outside the proscriptions of these constitutional provisions. Since the only encumbrance
lies against the fund created to receive the revenue, the lending credit provisions are not implicated.
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Despite the enactment of the Act, the Agency remains powerless to encumber the general
funds of the city or assess taxes on the general public. While the Agency is now a recipient for tax
funds allocated by the County Treasurer, the Agency has no independent power of taxation. Neither
the City of Rexburg nor the general fund are guarantors of the revenue allocation bonds. Yick Kong
remains binding authority on the proposition the Agency is not a subdivision of the state within the
meaning of Article VIII, § 4 or Article XII, § 4.

3.

Proceeds of Revenue Allocation Bonds Are Issued for the Benefit of a Public
Use.

Idaho has added a public purpose requirement to the lending credit provision. Engelking, 93
Idaho at 222,458 P.2d at 218. The Court specifically stated that funds being used to increase the
earnings of the state was a predominant and public use, and the credit clause precluded state action
which aims to aid various private schemes. Id. Where the funds are used to effectuate a broad public
purpose, no violation of the credit clause can be shown.
Contrary to Hart's assertions, the adoption of a financing mechanism or contractual
arrangement, which incidentally benefits private enterprise, does not violate the Constitution. The
question is whether a public entity, not a private one, controls the financing.
It is obvious that the framers of the Idaho Constitution had no intention of limiting
the power of municipalities to contract in furtherance of the public interest, but rather
oflimiting loans or donations of public credit. The words clearly limit the scope of
the credit clause to cases in which the public credit is under the control of private
interests.

Utah Power &Light Co. v. Campbell, 108 Idaho 950,954, 703 P.2d 714, 718 (1985) (emphasis in
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original).
Hart tries to cast the Riverside Park project undertaken by the Agency as the same type of
large-scale municipal debt that the drafters of the Idaho Constitution sought to avoid, arguing "the
private enterprises that follow urban renewal take advantage of a subsidized situation the same as
the railroads of old took advantage of the right of way grants." (Appellant's Brief, p. 17.) However,
the method of financing projects undertaken by urban renewal agencies is distinguishable from the
dubious and speculative financing schemes that concerned the drafters of the Idaho Constitution. In
particular, the Act does not allow private enterprise to impose any burden or obligation on the
taxpayers whatsoever-the Act expressly forbids such indebtedness. LC. §§ 50-2910 and 502012(b). The drafters "feared that private interests would gain advantage at the expense of the
taxpayers." YickKong, 94 Idaho at 884,499 P.2d at 583. Importantly, in YickKongthe Court found
no violation of the credit clauses because the urban renewal agency could not impose taxes or
encumber any public assets. Id. Simply stated, the Act does not allow "private interests" to gain
advantage at the expense of the taxpayers.
The Court has stated "the accrual of incidental benefits to a private enterprise will not
invalidate an otherwise constitutional transaction." Utah Power, l 08 Idaho at 955, 703 P .2d at 719;

see also, Engelking, 93 Idaho at 222, 458 P .2d at 218. In the specific context of urban renewal
agencies, the Idaho Supreme Court has also held that "mere incidental benefit to private interests will
not invalidate such an urban renewal plan." YickKong, 94 Idaho at 880,499 P.2d at 579. The fact
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private interests may incidentally benefit from revenue allocation financing does not render the Act
unconstitutional. Hart failed to present any evidence indicating private interests even benefit
incidentally from this project, or other urban renewal projects.
Hart's arguments are unpersuasive because Riverside Park does not fit within the definition
of"private development." The Legislature requires the urban renewal plan to give "due consideration
to the provision of adequate park and recreational areas and facilities that may be desirable for
neighborhood improvement, with special consideration for the health, safety and welfare of children
residing in the general vicinity of the site covered by the plan." LC. § 50-2008(d)(3). Installation and
construction of a park is expressly authorized by the Act and the Law under the definitions of an
urban renewal project. LC.§§ 50-2018(10) and 50-2903(13).
Hart has not alleged nor proven the primary purpose of the Act, either on its face or
as applied to the facts in this case, benefits private interests. No such evidence exists as the project
sought to be built from the proceeds of the revenue allocation bonds is a public park. See Project
Definition, p. 7. Because the public is the primary beneficiary of the declared purposes, there is no
unlawful lending of credit.
Certainly, public interests in the city ofRexburg are benefitted by the issuance of the revenue
allocation bonds for redevelopment. The proceeds from these bonds will be used to finance the
acquisition of land and construction of a public outdoor swimming facility, including dressing
facilities, access road, parking facilities, and related furnishings and improvements; construction and
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furnishing of a building for sporting and community events; installation of outdoor fields for soccer,
football, baseball, and other public recreation purposes, and related improvements-all of which
clearly serve a public rather than private purpose. While those facilities will provide the incidental
benefits of stimulating and assisting private development, they clearly fulfill the valid public purpose
of eliminating urban deterioration, stimulating the local economy, and increasing the tax base for the
various taxing districts, all to the benefit of the taxpayers in the expanded urban area.

4.

Authorities From Other Jurisdictions Uphold Revenue Allocation Financing Under a
Lending Credit Provision.
A number ofjurisdictions have upheld the constitutionality of revenue allocation financing

under constitutional provisions similar to Article VIII, § 4 and Article XII, § 4. See Denver Urban

Renewal Authority v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374 (Colo. 1980); People ex rel. City ofCanton v. Crouch,
403 N.E.2d 242 (Ill. 1980); In re Request for Advisory Opinion, 422 N.W.2d 186 (Mich. 1988); City

ofDuluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757 (Minn. 1986); City ofMinneapolis v. Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d 386
(Minn. 1980); City ofSparks v. Best, 605 P.2d 638 (Nev. 1980); Meierhenry v. City ofHuron, 354
N.W.2d 171 (S.D.1984);MetropolitanDevelopmentandHousingAgencyv.Leech, 591 S.W.2d427
(Tenn. 1979); Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d499 (Utah 1975); Salt Lake Countyv. Murray

City Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979).

V. CONCLUSION
The Findings of Pact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree of the district court
should be affirmed and the Agency awarded its attorney fees and costs on appeal.
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